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Summary 
In this paper, we empirically investigate a channel through which social capital may improve 
economic wellbeing and the functioning of institutions: political accountability. The main 
idea is that voters who share norms of generalized morality demand higher standards of 
behavior on their elected representavtives, are more willing to bear the cost of acquiring 
information, and are more likely to base their vote on criteria of social welfare rather than 
(narrow) personal interest. We take this conjecture to the data using information on the 
Italian members of Parliament in the postwar period (1948–2001). The empirical evidence 
shows that the electoral punishment of political misbehavior is considerably larger in 
electoral districts with high social capital, where social capital is measured by blood 
donation, and political misbehavior refers to receiving a request of criminal prosecution or 
shirking in parliamentary activity. Accordingly, episodes of political misbehavior are less 
frequent in electoral districts with high social capital. 
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In this paper, we investigate a channel through which social (or civic) capital may
improve economic wellbeing and the functioning of institutions: political account-
ability. The main idea is that voters who share values and beliefs that foster coop-
eration are more likely to base their vote on criteria of social welfare rather than
narrow personal interest. We frame this intuition into a simple model of political
accountability with retrospective voting and heterogeneous endowments of civic at-
titudes. We then take this conjecture to the data using information on the Italian
members of Parliament in the postwar period (1948–2001). The empirical evidence
shows that the electoral punishment of political misbehavior is considerably larger
in electoral districts with high social capital, where political misbehavior refers to
receiving a request of criminal prosecution or shirking in parliamentary activity, and
social capital is measured by blood donation (or by non-proﬁt organizations and
electoral turnout). Accordingly, political misbehaviors are less frequent in electoral
districts where civic attitudes are widespread.
JEL codes: D72, D73, Z10.
Keywords: social capital, culture, political agency.
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it usually makes every eﬀort to keep them separate. (...) A despot easily forgives his
subjects for not loving him, provided they do not love one another.
Tocqueville (1840)
In a society of amoral familists there will be few checks on oﬃcials, for checking on
oﬃcials will be the business of other oﬃcials only.
Banﬁeld (1958)
1 Introduction
Several political scientists and economists have argued that social capital is an important
determinant of economic development and of the functioning of institutions (Banﬁeld 1958;
Putnam 1993, 2000; Fukuyama 1995; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2008a; Tabellini 2008,
2009; Algan and Cahuc 2010; Aghion et al. 2010).1 But what is the mechanism through
which this happens? And what exactly does social capital stand for? Despite a large
literature on these topics, these questions remain largely unanswered.
The goal of this paper is to explore one particular channel through which social capital
can induce eﬃcient economic and political outcomes. The basic idea is that voters who
share cultural traits based on respect and solidarity for others are more likely to hold
politicians accountable to high standards of behavior, and are less tolerant of moral hazard
by their elected representatives.
As in Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2010), we deﬁne social capital as civic capital,
that is, “those persistent and shared beliefs and values that help a group overcome the free
rider problem in the pursuit of socially valuable activities.”2 We introduce this notion of
civic capital in a model of political accountability studied by Barro (1973), Ferejhon (1986)
and Persson and Tabellini (2000), where we add two types of voters, civic and uncivic.
Both types vote retrospectively, but while civic citizens condition their vote on aggregate
welfare, uncivic citizens cast their vote based on group-speciﬁc welfare. We then show that
1In particular, social capital—measured in a number of ways, from survey responses on the level of
trust to blood donation—has been shown to be positively associated with economic development (Knack
and Keefer 1997, Tabellini 2009), ﬁnancial development (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2004), indicators
of good government (Putnam 1993, La Porta et al. 1997), female labor participation (Fernandez and Fogli
2009), and work eﬀort (Ichino and Maggi 2000).
2Similarly, Algan and Cahuc (2009) deﬁne “civic virtue” as a set of values and beliefs that help solving
the moral hazard issues which hinder the eﬃciency of unemployment insurance.
1the amount of endogenous rents grabbed by the incumbent politician decreases with the
share of civic voters. The reason is that uncivic voters allow the incumbent politician to
adopt a divide-and-rule strategy, and in equilibrium this reduces the electoral punishment
for rents (or misbehavior). Intuitively, civic voters refrain from rewarding a corrupt or
lazy politician despite receiving some targeted or clientelistic beneﬁts from him, but this
is not incentive compatible for the uncivic voters in a Nash equilibrium where diﬀerent
groups do not cooperate. Social (or civic) capital is therefore a tool to sustain implicit
cooperation between voters. The larger is the set of voters who cooperate, the smaller is
the equilibrium amount of rents grabbed by the incumbent.3
To empirically test these implications, we exploit data on the behavior of Italian voters
and political representatives in the postwar period. Italy is ideally suited to ask these
questions, because within Italy there are large diﬀerences in social capital and other related
cultural traits. We compare the average behavior of voters and members of Parliament in
diﬀerent electoral districts. Our main indicator of social capital is average per-capita blood
donations in Italian provinces, although the results are robust to alternative measures. We
rely on two indicators of misbehavior of political incumbents in national elections: the ﬁrst
is represented by prosecutors’ requests to proceed with criminal investigation against a
member of Parliament (Richiesta di Autorizzazione a Procedere, called RAP from here
on); the second is the rate of absenteeism in electronic votes by members of Parliament
over the legislative term.
According to both indicators, misbehavior by the incumbent is more frequent in elec-
toral districts with less social capital. More importantly, the electoral punishment of the
incumbent’s misbehavior is stronger in districts with more social capital. Receiving a RAP
for serious crimes reduces individual preference votes in the (open-list) proportional system
before 1994 by 25% in districts with above-average social capital, while it has no impact
in the others. An increase in the absenteeism rate equal to its standard deviation reduces
the probability of being reelected in the same majoritarian (single-member) district after
3We conjecture that similar results would hold in the adverse selection model studied by Alesina
and Tabellini (2008). Also note that the political agency literature (e.g., see Besley 2006) suggests an
additional channel—besides cooperation—through which social capital might aﬀect equilibrium political
outcomes, that is, information. In these models, more informed voters are better able to discipline the
incumbent or to select more competent representatives. Higher social capital mightincrease the willingness
of any atomistic individual to bear the cost of gathering and processing information about the behavior
of political representatives. Indeed, Alesina and Giuliano (2011) show that the more individuals rely on
the family as a provider of services, insurance, and transfer of resources, the lower civic engagement and
political participation are.
21994 by 24 percentage points (about 42%) in provinces with above-average social capital,
while it has a positive (although insigniﬁcant) impact in the others. Our estimates are
robust to the use of a number of politician-speciﬁc and district-speciﬁc control variables
(including income, education, and newspapers diﬀusion in the electoral district), as well
as province of election and politician ﬁxed eﬀects in most speciﬁcations. In particular, to
control for voters’ information, we use the district-speciﬁc readership of non-sport news-
papers, and the impact of civic attitudes on the diﬀusion of political misbehavior and its
electoral punishment remains signiﬁcant both in statistical and economic terms.
A few empirical studies have asked whether voters punish political corruption or other
misbehaviors by their elected representatives. Peters and Welch (1980) ﬁrst tackled this
issue by evaluating the impact of corruption charges on the reelection prospects of the
US Representatives in the elections from 1968 to 1978. Their study ﬁnds that voters
do indeed punish corrupt politicians, although corruption charges represent only one of
the many factors concerning voters when casting their vote. Welch and Hibbing (1997)
reach a similar conclusion, ﬁnding that corruption charges rarely cause incumbent US
Representatives to resign, retire, or lose in primaries, although they often make politicians
lose votes and occasionally elections. For Brazil, Ferraz and Finan (2008) exploit (random)
audit reports on municipal governments and show that corruption disclosure is punished
by voters in terms of decreased reelectionprobability. They also show that this punishment
is more pronounced in municipalities with radio stations.
A contribution closely related to ours is represented by Chang, Golden, and Hill (2010),
who study the ﬁrst elevenlegislative terms of the Italian Republic from 1948 to 1994. They
assess the impact of receivinga RAP on the probability of being reelectedin the subsequent
term, and ﬁnd that being investigated for a potentially serious crime slightly decreases the
probability of reelection, approximately by the same degree found by Peters and Welch
(1980) for the US. Looking at the legislative terms separately, however, they ﬁnd that
corruption charges aﬀect the reelection prospects of Italian Representatives only in the
last term, that is, in the XI legislature (1992–94), characterized by major judicial scandals
that involved one third of the members of Parliament and a breakdown of the party system
that made the major political parties of the postwar period disappear. According to their
interpretation, the reaction of voters was particularly strong in the 1990s because of the
exceptional dissemination of relevant information by the mass media in this period.
Gagliarducci, Nannicini, and Naticchioni (2011) also closely relate to our study. They
3show that political rent-seeking, measured as the absenteeism rate of members of Parlia-
ment, which is in turn correlated with their outside income, is more pronounced for politi-
cians electedin the majoritarian system as opposed to politicians electedunder (closed-list)
proportional representation. These previous results are consistent with ours. These papers
estimate the average eﬀect of political misbehavior on election outcomes, however, and did
not ask whether the election outcomes diﬀer by electoral districts based on social capital,
information, or other observable voters’ features.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces a model of political ac-
countability where voters are heterogeneous in civic attitudes. Section 3 describes the
data. Section 4 presents the empirical results on how social capital inﬂuences political
misbehavior. Section 5 discusses how social capital inﬂuences election outcomes. Section
6 presents some robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.
2 Theory
2.1 A model of political accountability
The model is adapted from Persson and Tabellini (2000), who in turn extendthe framework
of political agency originally formulated by Barro (1973) and Ferejhon (1986).
There are N groups of voters indexed by J, and the size of each group is normalized
to unity. Although we speak of groups, we could interpret groups as regions. Voters in
group J have preferences:
w
J = c
J + H(g) = y − τ + f
J + H(g),
where cJ = y−τ+fJ denotes private consumption, y is income, τ is a lump sum tax, fJ is
a non-negative lump sum transfer to members of group J, and g is a general public good
beneﬁting all voters. Besides ﬁnancing public consumption and targeted transfers, tax
revenues can be appropriated by the government in oﬃce; these political rents, denoted
r, only beneﬁt the government and provide no utility to voters. Thus, the government
budget constraint is:




For simplicity we model the government as a single decision maker, called the incum-
bent. The incumbent sets policy for the current period and then elections are held. If
4reappointed, the incumbent enjoys exogenous rents from oﬃce, R. Thus, R can be inter-
preted as the expected present value of holding oﬃce from the next period and onwards.
Indeed, although this is a one-period model, the results would apply identically to an
inﬁnite horizon setting without government debt (see Persson and Tabellini 2000). With
this notation, the incumbent maximizes:
E(vI) = r + pR, (2)
where p denotes the probability of reappointment, to be derived endogenously.
The timing of events is as follows. (i) All voters simultaneously choose a retrospective
voting rule. (ii) The incumbent chooses policy:
￿
fJ￿
, g, τ, and r, which is fully observed
by voters. (iii) Elections are held. At the electoral stage, the voters perceive no diﬀerence
between the incumbent and the opponent in terms of ideology or competence: the two
candidates are identical in the eyes of the voters, except for their past histories.
Within each group, there are two kinds of voters: “civic” voters, who behave altruisti-
cally and condition their retrospective vote on aggregate welfare, w. And “uncivic” voters,
who condition their vote on their own welfare (which here coincides with group speciﬁc
welfare), wJ. Let 1 ≥ σ ≥ 0 denote the fraction of civic voters, for simplicity assumed to
be the same in each group—we relax this assumption below. Both kinds of voters set their
voting rule optimally, within the class of retrospective voting rules, taking into account the
equilibrium behavior of all other voters. But whereas uncivic voters care exclusively about
their own individual utility, civic citizens vote altruistically so as to maximize aggregate
welfare. As we shall see below, this is equivalent to say that civic individuals cooperate
when they vote, whereas uncivic voters play their best response to the strategy of others.
Both kinds of political behavior are plausible. Our goal is to see what are the implications
of changes in σ, the fraction of civic voters. This fraction is our theoretical counterpart
of social capital. In other words, we interpret social capital in a political agency context
as the fraction of citizens who refrain from voting based on a narrow deﬁnition of welfare,
and who instead hold politicians accountable for an aggregate measure of social welfare.
Clearly, the socially optimal policy, if we could abstract from informational or agency
problems, would be to always set r = 0, and to have public good provision fulﬁll the
Samuelson criterion, namely to set g = g∗, where:
NHg(g
∗) = 1. (3)
52.2 Equilibrium under civic majority
Consider ﬁrst the case in which civic voters are a majority (σ ≥ 1/2). Thus, to be reelected
the incumbent must please civic voters. Let $ be the reservation level of aggregate welfare
demanded by them. This means that the probability of reelection is:
p =
￿
1 iﬀ W ≡ y − τ + H(g) ≥ $
0 otherwise (4)
where W is aggregate welfare (given linear utility and lump sum taxes, targeted transfers
cancel out). As shown by Persson and Tabellini (2000), the optimal voting rule in this
class leaves the incumbent indiﬀerent between two strategies: pleasing the voters with
a policy satisfying the top row in (4) and being rewarded with reelection and a total
payoﬀ of v = r + R, or foregoing reelection, myopically maximizing rents as a Leviathan
policymaker, setting τ = y and g = 0, and thus collecting the maximal rent, Ny. The
indiﬀerence condition can then be stated as:
r
C = Max[0,Ny − R], (5)
where the C superscript stands for civic majority. This expression is the minimum level
of rents that civic voters must tolerate in the equilibrium of this game. Equilibrium taxes
and public good provisions are then set by the incumbent so as to please civic voters. This
entails maximizing social welfare, subject to the constraint that rents must be rC. For
concreteness, suppose that foregoing rC leaves suﬃcient revenues for optimal public good
provision, speciﬁcally
g
∗ ≤ R, (6)
where g∗ is the Samuelson optimum deﬁned by (3). Then the equilibrium policy is gC = g∗
and τC = (gC + rC)/N. The equilibrium reservation utility demanded by civic voters is
then:4
$






Targeted transfers are either not used, or they are indeterminate (by linear utility and
non-distorting taxation, the tax rate would be correspondingly higher if fJ > 0). This is
the same equilibrium amount of public goods and rents discussed by Persson and Tabellini
4If instead taxes are insuﬃcient to pay for equilibrium rents and for the socially optimal public good,
i.e., if Hg(Ny − rC) > 1/N, then equilibrium taxes are τ = y and g is residually determined from the
budget constraint.
6(2000) under the constraint fJ = 0. In other words, if a majority of voters is civic (or
altruistic) and holds the incumbent accountable based on an aggregate measure of welfare,
then the equilibrium amount of public goods and rents is the same as if targeted transfers
were not available as a policy tool.
2.3 Equilibrium under uncivic majority
Next, consider the case in which civic voters are a minority (σ < 1/2). Here the incumbent
must seek the support of at least some uncivic voters, and the previous outcome can no
longer be supported as an equilibrium. The logic is the same as discussed by Persson and
Tabellini (2000) for the special case σ = 0. Suppose that all voters, civic and uncivic,
demand the same reservation utility $C deﬁned by (7). The incumbent can increase rents
for himself by reducing g and raising τ, oﬀsetting the induced loss of welfare by means of
positive transfers fJ to enough uncivic voters to keep a majority satisﬁed. Since taxes are
raised from everyone while transfers are only given to some voters, and since by (3) the
marginal utilityof the public good is relativelysmall, the incumbenthas the room to do this
and strictly increase rents for himself. But this deviation cannot be an equilibrium either,
because the uncivic voters in the groups that do not receive any transfers, anticipating
this outcome, would bid down their reservation utility just below $C so as to be included
in the minimum winning coalition.
In equilibrium, the reservation utilities chosen by uncivic voters in group J, $J, must
be a best response to $I for all I 6= J, taking into account the induced eﬀects on the
incumbent’s behavior. The incumbent in turn maximizes rents, subject to the reelection
constraint.
As we shall see below, in equilibrium uncivic voters are less demanding than civic
voters. Hence the incumbent will only seek the support of uncivic voters within each
group. Thus, the reelection constraint can be written as
y − τ + f
J + H(g) ≥ $
J, for J = 1,2,...,M, (8)
where M is the minimum number of groups that guarantees a bare majority to the in-
cumbent. Given that each group has σ uncivic voters, and neglecting integer constraints,
we have:
M = N/2σ. (9)
7The incumbent thus maximizes rents, subject to the government budget constraint (1),
to non-negativity constraints on
￿
fJ￿
and r, to τ ≤ y, and to (8)–(9). Assuming that
the non-negativity constraint on rents does not bind, the solution to this optimization




U) = 2σ (10)
r
U = Ny − g
U.
Furthermore, since in equilibrium uncivic voters in all groups must demand the same
reservation utility, in equilibrium fJ = 0 for all J and the incumbent is reelected. To
verify that this is the only equilibrium policy outcome, note that no group of uncivic
voters can unilaterally increase its reservation utility, because it would simply be left out
of the minimum winning coalition. And even if civic voters are more demanding and vote
for the opponent, their vote is not pivotal and can be safely neglected by the incumbent.
Contrasting (10) with the equilibrium described above, where civic voters are a ma-
jority, it is easy to see that here all voters are worse oﬀ, since rC < rU, gC > gU, τC < τU.
The intuition is the same as in Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Ferejhon (1986). Since
uncivic voters are a majority, the incumbent can exploit their conﬂict of interest to his own
beneﬁt by adopting a divide-and-rule strategy. At the same time, the opponent cannot
promise that he will not play the same disruptive game, which leaves the voters at the
mercy of the incumbent.
The main novel result here is that, as the fraction σ of civic voters increases (although
they remain a strict minority), the equilibrium entails a better policy outcome for all
voters. Speciﬁcally:
Proposition 1 In the equilibrium where uncivic voters are a majority, as the fraction σ
of civic voters increases, equilibrium rents decrease and public good provision increases.
5Omitting the non-negativity constraints on fJ and the upper bound on τ, the Lagrangian for the




λJ[y − τ + fJ + H(Nτ −
N X
I
fI − r) − $J]
where λJ is the Lagrange multiplier for (8). Solving this optimization problem implies λJ = 1 for
J = 1,2..M, and after some transformations the ﬁrst order conditions imply (10).
8This can be seen immediately by (10). The intuition is that a larger fraction σ of civic
voters increases M; see equation (9). That is, to please a majority of uncivic voters, the
incumbent must seek the support of a larger number of groups. This in turn makes it
more costly to compensate the losers from a reduction in public goods, and thus it forces
the incumbent to maintain the equilibrium closer to the cooperative outcome obtained
when civic voters are a majority. To put it diﬀerently, M captures the eﬀective size of the
minimum winning coalition of groups supporting the incumbent. As σ increases, so does
M. And a larger minimum winning coalition entails a policy closer to the equilibrium
with civic majority.
Note also that the result in Proposition 1 extends to a situation where diﬀerent groups
have diﬀerent fractions of civic voters, say σJ. Here too, fJ = 0 for all groups J. The
reason is that Bertrand competition to be included in the minimum winning coalition
continues to impose that all groups are treated equally. But as long as civic voters are not
a majority in the population, it remains true that an increase in any σJ entails a better
aggregate policy outcome.
Finally, note that in this equilibrium civic voters are not pivotal. Hence in equilibrium
they can demand any reservation utility equal to or above the equilibrium reservation
utility $J of uncivic voters. It is reasonable to assume that in equilibrium civic voters
will continue to set their reservation utility at the level $C in (7) above. If so, and since
$C > $J, we get the additional implication that, as long as uncivic voters are a majority,
a higher value of σ is associated with a larger fraction of votes against the incumbent. In
other words, the more widespread civic attitudes, the higher the electoral punishment for
the larger rents under uncivic majority (i.e., rU > rC).
Summarizing, the theory yields the following predictions with regard to the equilibrium
where uncivic voters are a majority (σ < 1/2): As the fraction of civic voters increases,
rents decrease, public good provision increases, and the fraction of votes supporting the
incumbent decreases.
We now turn to the empirical investigation. Exploiting the Italian data and institutions
described below, we test whether political rents (or misbehavior) are lower as the share
of civic voters increases (both because rC < rU when σ > 1/2, and because rU decreases
with σ when σ < 1/2). We will also test whether this is due to the fact that the electoral
punishment for political misbehavior (and therefore political accountability) is higher as
the share of civic voters increases.
93 The data
Because Italian political institutions have changed in the postwar period, we use two
samples and diﬀerent measures of electoral outcomes and misbehavior in the two samples.
In both samples, we have an unbalanced panel where the units of analysis are members of
Parliament, and the period refers to legislative terms. As explained below, however, some
variables refer to the electoral district where the incumbent stands for reelection.
Table 1 summarizes the two samples. The ﬁrst one refers to the legislatures elected
between 1948 (the ﬁrst parliamentary election of the Italian Republic) and 1987, thus
legislatures I–X included.6 During this period, also known as First Republic, the electoral
system for the Parliament was proportional representation with open party lists (i.e., with
the possibility of casting preference votes on individual candidates). After dropping obser-
vations with missing values, we end up with a sample of 5,849 representatives in the First
Republic. The source is Chang, Golden, and Hill (2010). The data only refer to the House
of Representatives (therefore excluding the Senate). In this sample, we measure political
outcomes by the diﬀerence in preference votes received by the incumbent between two
consecutive elections (expressed in logs). Clearly, this variable is only available for incum-
bents who stood for reelection. In the First Republic, preference votes were important not
only because they ordered candidates within each party list and thus determined election
outcomes, but also because they measured each candidate’s political inﬂuence and were
used to allocate party resources and appointments. On average, politicians in the South
collected more preference votes, even after controlling for district magnitude. Indeed, the
number of personal votes normalized by the total number of representatives elected in the
district was about 1,227 in the North, 1,605 in the Center, and 2,211 in the South (all
diﬀerences signiﬁcant at the 1% level).
Throughout this period, elected representatives enjoyed immunity from criminal pros-
ecution. Immunity could be waved by a vote of Parliament, at the request of the pros-
ecutor. The prosecutor’s request to continue with its criminal investigation (RAP) was
public knowledge, it typically received a lot of attention from the media, and it was always
6The XI legislative term (1992–1994) marks the transition to the so-called Second Republic, following
judicial scandals that destroyed major political parties and led to the adoption of a mixed electoral
system in 1993. This term is excluded from the analysis, because members of Parliament elected in 1992
(eventually) stood for reelection under a diﬀerent electoral system, and also because it clearly represents
an outlier in the history of the Italian First Republic.
10brought to Parliament for a ﬁnal vote on the issue.7 Our measure of misbehavior in this
sample (i.e., the empirical counterpart of r in the theoretical model) consists of a dummy
variable equal to one if the incumbent representative received a RAP in the outgoing leg-
islative term, and zero otherwise.8 The source for this variable is again the dataset by
Chang, Golden, and Hill (2010). Not all alleged criminal oﬀenses brought against elected
representatives were actually very serious, though. For instance, some RAP’s refer to
crimes such as the promotion of meetings in public places without prior notice, the pub-
lication or spreading of false news, or road-traﬃc oﬀenses. For this reason, we also coded
a dummy variable that refers only to the more serious crimes (serious RAP), namely cor-
ruption, private interest in oﬃcial duties, racketeering organization, fraud, and violence
(including murder).9
By deﬁnition, a RAP is an allegation of malfeasance, rather than a conviction, and as
such it could also capture judicial zeal and prejudice. As noted by Chang, Golden, and Hill
(2010), however, at the province level there exists a strong correlation between charged
corruption (as measured by the fraction of representatives receiving a RAP) and a more
objective measure of corruption based on the extent of missing infrastructures in public
works in the 1990s.10 Furthermore, it should be noted that members of Parliament could
receive a RAP from any Italian tribunal and the political or cultural attitudes of local
judges are not necessarily correlated with the probability of being charged. In the whole
sample, we observe that politicians belonging to the opposition parties were more likely to
be charged until the 1970s, while politicians in the government coalition were more likely
to be charged afterwards.11 In our empirical analysis, we always control for the partisan
identity of politicians in examining the political impact of malfeasance charges.
Table 2 shows that 24% of the representatives in our sample received at least one
RAP, half of them (12% of the sample) for serious crimes. In Figure 1, the bottom maps
show the geographical distribution of the two measures across the 32 electoral districts
of the First Republic; darker districts correspond to a higher incidence of malfeasance.
7Parliamentary immunity and the RAP procedure were abrogated in 1993 by the XI legislature.
8Many representatives actually received more than one RAP, but the results reported below are robust
to replacing the dummy variable with the actual number of RAP’s received.
9In Appendix I, we give details on the criminal oﬀenses included in both measures.
10See Golden and Picci (2005) on how this measure of corruption is built.
11Throughout the sample period of the First Republic, the government coalition was formed by the
Christian Democrats (DC, the biggest Italian party), its minor centrist allies, and, eventually, the Italian
Socialist Party (PSI). The opposition parties were the Italian Communist Party (PCI, the second biggest
Italian party) on the left and the post-fascist party (MSI) on the right.
11In particular, representatives elected in Southern districts are more likely to receive both
types of criminal prosecutions, and these regional diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant.12
The second sample refers to legislatures XII and XIII in the Second Republic, corre-
sponding to the period 1994–2001. Following the 1993 electoral reform, this second sample
has a mixed electoral system: about 75% of both the House of Representative and the Sen-
ate were elected in single-member districts under plurality rule. The remaining 25% was
elected under proportional representation with closed party lists (i.e., without preference
votes) for the House, and under proportional representation selecting the best losers in
the single-member districts for the Senate. Since we expect accountability to be stronger
under plurality rule, in the baseline estimations, we restrict our attention to incumbents
that stand for reelection in single-member districts.13 We also exclude the XIV legislature
(2001-2006), because in 2005 there was yet another electoral reform reintroducing pro-
portional representation. As a robustness check, however, we also look at the members
of Parliament elected in the proportional tier of the mixed-member electoral system: 595
observations over the terms XII, XIII, and XIV (because proportional politicians could be
reelected in the same system/district also in the XV term).
We thus measure political outcomes in this second sample as a dummy variable that
equals one if the incumbent is reelected in the same electoral district, and zero otherwise.
We comment below on the robustness of the results if the dummy variable is redeﬁned
as equal to one if the incumbent is reelected, irrespective of whether in the same or in
another district. Table 3 shows that 50% of members of Parliament were reelected, 32% in
the same (majoritarian) district. There are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in reelection patterns
across the diﬀerent areas of Italy (North, Center, and South).
Since parliamentary immunitywas dropped in 1993, in the Second Republic we measure
political misbehavior (r) by absenteeism, deﬁned as the percentage of votes missed in the
outgoing legislature without a legitimate reason. The source for this variable is the dataset
used by Gagliarducci, Nannicini, and Naticchioni (2011). Absenteeism is clearly a less
12The regional diﬀerences in the probability of receiving a RAP are always statistically signiﬁcant at
the 1% level. The diﬀerence in the probability of receiving a serious RAP between the North and the
South is also signiﬁcant at the 1% level, while the diﬀerences between the Center and the other two areas
are signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
13Persson and Tabellini (2000) study a theoretical model based on career concerns, which predicts ac-
countabilityto be stronger under pluralityrule than under closed-list proportional representation. Persson,
Tabellini, and Trebbi (2003) in cross-country data and Gagliarducci, Nannicini, and Naticchioni (2011)
in the data set of Italian politicians we also use show that this is conﬁrmed by the empirical evidence.
12important form of misbehavior, compared to being accused of criminal oﬀenses. It is also
less widely publicized. Nevertheless, it is still a breach of the implicit contract between the
representative and his voters, and it corresponds closely to the theoretical constructs of
the political agency literature on moral hazard. Gagliarducci, Nannicini, and Naticchioni
(2010) show that absenteeism is positively associated with the amount of outside income
by members of Parliament, therefore capturing shirking or rent-seeking. As shown in
Table 3, the average absenteeism rate is about 34%. In Figure 2, the bottom map shows
the geographical distribution of parliamentary absences across Italian provinces; darker
provinces correspond to a higher absenteeism rate by the members of Parliament elected
there. The average absenteeism rate in the North (36%) is diﬀerent from the average rate
in the Center (32%) and in the South (39%) only at the 10% signiﬁcance level, while the
diﬀerence between the Center and the South is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
For both samples, we also observe several features of political incumbents. We report
them in Table 2 and Table 3 for the earlier and later sample, respectively. These observed
characteristics can be grouped in two broad categories. First, we observe some individual
features, such as gender, age, marital status, and education and pre-election occupation.
Over 90% of incumbents are male, their average age is about 50 (a bit younger in the earlier
sample, and a bit older in the latter sample), and most of them have college education (63%
in the earlier sample, 70% in the later one). Second, we know the recent political history
of each incumbent, and in particular whether they belonged to the majority coalition,
whether they had a role in national or local government, or in a parliamentary committee,
or in their party, and whether they were freshmen or nor. More such variables are available
in the second sample than in the ﬁrst one. Their sources are the datasets mentioned above
for the First Republic and Second Republic.
Finally, we also collected data on the district in which the incumbent stands for reelec-
tion, relying on data collected at the level of the province. In the ﬁrst sample, there are
32 districts, in some cases consisting of a single province, in others of several provinces.
In the second sample there are 475 single-member districts in the House and 230 in the
Senate, and often an electoral district is a subset of a province. The data on social capital
and other district-speciﬁc covariates are aggregated at the province level.
Following Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004), social capital is measured by blood
donations per capita in 1995; speciﬁcally, by the number of blood bags (about 16oz) every
100 inhabitants. For the First Republic, we measure social capital in the electoral district
13by taking the weighted average of per-capita blood donations in the provinces included
in that district. For the Second Republic, we impute to each single-member district the
level of per-capita blood donations in the province containing that district. We can also
construct social capital in the province or region of birth of each incumbent, since we know
where he/she is born.
According to the theory, social capital refers to the diﬀusion of civic attitudes, and in
particular to the fraction of voters who care about aggregate (as opposed to individual)
welfare - the parameter σ in the theoretical model. The level of blood donations is a good
proxy for this unobserved social feature. In Italy there are neither legal nor economic
incentives to donate blood, which is therefore an altruistic decision only driven by social
pressure or internalized norms. The anonymous collection procedures are set nationally
and administered by a single national organization (AVIS), and therefore the data do not
reﬂect diﬀerences in the quality or diﬀusion of medical infrastructures. The source for
these data is Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004). As shown in the top map of both
Figure 1 and Figure 2 (where the darker areas are associated with more social capital),
the distribution of blood donations in Northern and Southern Italy is starkly diﬀerent.
Civic attitudes are more widespread in the North, although there is a lot of variation also
within macro-regions, that is, across provinces in the North, Center, and South.
To perform some robustness checks, we also collected alternative indicators of social
capital, such as the number of non-proﬁt organizations per capita (from the 2001 Census;
see Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2008b), the number of employees in non-proﬁt orga-
nizations per capita (from the 2001 Census), the average turnout in national elections,
European elections, and referenda during the 1990s (see Cartocci 2007). Most of the re-
sults are robust to the use of these alternative indicators of social capital. In Section 6,
we replicate the baseline speciﬁcations of our empirical strategy using the ﬁrst principal
component of these indicators as an alternative measure of social capital.
As additional control variables at the district level, we also collected data on per-capita
income in 2003, and the percentage of the over-19 population with a high school degree
in 2003. Their source is the National Statistical Oﬃce (ISTAT). As a proxy for voters’
information about politics, we retrieved data on the diﬀusion of non-sport newspapers in
2001–2002. The source is again the dataset collected by Cartocci (2007). All of these
data also refer to the province and are aggregated to the district as described above. We
have non-missing data for 92 Italian provinces. Table 4 displays summary statistics and
14correlation coeﬃcients for blood donations, per-capita income, education, and newspapers
diﬀusion at the province level. Clearly, social capital is positively correlated with economic
development and voters’ information, although it displays a negative correlation with the
level of education attained in the province.
4 Social capital and political misbehavior
This section investigates the link between political misbehavior (r) and social capital (σ).
By Proposition 1 in the theoretical framework, more social capital should discourage polit-
ical misbehavior though voters’ behavior. This is not the only way in which social capital
might inﬂuence political misbehavior, however, since social capital might be “embedded”
in the representatives themselves. The behavior of political representatives also reﬂects
their values and preferences. An environment with low social capital might breed polit-
ical representatives who are more opportunistic and less likely to internalize true social
welfare. The two alternative channels are hard to disentangle empirically, also because
voters’ behavior aﬀects the intrinsic qualities of politicians through selection eﬀects.
In our baseline regression, the dependent variable is political misbehavior by political
incumbents, and the regressor of interest is social capital:




jα + ￿ijt, (11)
where subscript i refers to the politician, j to the area of election, t to the legislature; the
dependent variable Y measures either having received a RAP, or absenteeism, both in the
current legislature. The variable of interest is social capital in the area of election, SCj.
Throughout we also control for a set of observable individual features listed in Tables 2
and 3 (the vector X), and of district-speciﬁc variables listed in Table 4 (the vector Z).
Estimation is by Probit, when the dependent variable is the binary variable RAP, or OLS,
when the dependent variable is the rate of absenteeism.14
Equation (11) is a reduced form, in the sense that, as already noted, the coeﬃcient of
interest τ reﬂects the social capital of both politicians and voters. Moreover, the eﬀect
of voters’ social capital might operate both directly (it discourages moral hazard by the
incumbent) or indirectly, through sorting (incumbents who are more likely to misbehave
14As the absenteeism rate is bounded between 0 and 1, we also estimated equation (11) with the GLM
estimator proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996), and all of the results were quantitatively the same
(available upon request).
15choose to stand for election in areas with low social capital). In our case, however, self-
selection is a component of the eﬀect we want to identify.
To shed more light on the interplay between voters’ and politicians’ social capital, we
exploit the politicians’ place of birth (k) and the associated social capital (SCk). Thus,
we estimate alternatively




jα + ￿ijkt, (12)
to control for the time-invariant characteristics of politicians’ place of birth γk (including
social capital, which is usually assumed to be persistent in time), and






kα2 + ￿ijkt (13)
in the subsample of migrants, namely politicians who stand for election in an area (j)
diﬀerent from that of birth (k), for whom SCj 6= SCk.15 This last regression, however,
should be interpreted with caution, because migrants are a (very) self-selected subsample,
meaning that they are not a random draw from the original population in the province of
birth and SCk could thus be uninformative about their true social capital.
In principle we could also estimate (11) with individual ﬁxed eﬀects, drawing inference
from movers (as opposed to migrants), that is, individualincumbentsrunning for reelection
in diﬀerent districts at diﬀerent points in time. In both samples there are too few such
individuals, however, and such speciﬁcation leads to inconclusive results.
4.1 Criminal prosecutions
Table 5 reports the estimates when the dependent variable is the binary variable RAP
(marginal eﬀects are reported). The upper panel measures RAP by the more comprehen-
sive deﬁnition, while the lower panel refers to serious crimes.
The ﬁrst two columns include social capital in the district of election. Column 1 is the
most parsimonious speciﬁcation, that includes however per capita income and education
in the district, as well as dummy variables for ﬁve macro-regions (North-West, North-East,
Center, South, Islands). Hence the estimated coeﬃcient of interest only reﬂects variation
15As a reference, we also look at the social capital of birth in isolation:





controlling for the (time-invariant) characteristics of the district of election γj.
16across districts and within each macro-region. Given the high correlation between social
capital and the other district speciﬁc variables, and considering that there are only 32
districts, this is already a demanding speciﬁcation. The estimates reveal that the incidence
of both general and serious RAP are signiﬁcantly lower in districts with more social capital.
In particular, according to the baseline speciﬁcation in column 1, an increase in social
capital equal to its standard deviation would reduce the incidence of receiving a RAP by
about 16%, and the incidence of a RAP for serious crimes by about 7%. Moving from the
lowest level of social capital (recorded in the Southern province of Caltanissetta) to the
average level would reduce RAP by 20%, and serious RAP by 9%. Moving from the lowest
to the highest level of social capital (recorder in the Northern province of Cremona) would
reduce RAP by 75%, and serious RAP by 35%.
Column 2 adds newspapers circulation in the district as a regressor. Its estimated
coeﬃcient is always statistically signiﬁcant in both panels. The estimated coeﬃcient of
social capital shrinks, and remains statistically signiﬁcant when RAP refers to the general
deﬁnition (upper panel), but not with regard to serious crimes (lower panel). This suggests
that at least part of the eﬀect of social capital in the district of election reﬂects the channel
of information diﬀusion.
The remaining columns attempt to disentangle the eﬀect of social capital in the district
of election versus the region of birth. Column 3 starts by adding to the basic speciﬁcation
a dummy variable for the region of birth.16 The estimated coeﬃcient in the district of
election does not change at all (in the upper panel) or it shrinks a little (in the lower
panel), and it remains statistically signiﬁcant only with regard to general RAP. Overall,
this suggests that social capital where elected plays an important role, irrespective of the
region of birth. This inference is reinforced by the remaining three columns. When social
capital in the district of election is replaced by social capital in the region of birth, the
latter is statistically signiﬁcant in both panels if ﬁxed eﬀects for the district of election
are omitted (column 4), but not if they are included (column 5). Moreover, when both
social capital where elected and at birth are included (column 6), restricting the sample to
migrants only, the estimated coeﬃcient of social capital remains negative and very large in
absolute value, although imprecisely estimated, and it is signiﬁcant with regard to general
RAP; the estimated coeﬃcient of social capital at birth, instead, is never signiﬁcant.
16Unfortunately, the First Republic sample does not contain information on the province of birth.
17The eﬀect of social capital on criminal prosecutions thus seems a feature of where
the incumbent is elected, and not of where he comes from. Both this and the relevance
of newspapers diﬀusion suggest that the eﬀect captures the behavior of voters, rather
than inherited norms of the candidates. Nevertheless, we cannot be sure because we lack
information on where the candidate grew up. Moreover, intrinsic features of the candidate
might still play a role if more demanding voters’ behavior induce sorting by the candidates
across districtswith diﬀerent social capital. This is indeed part of the eﬀect of social capital
on political misbehavior that we are identifying.
A ﬁnal concern with the above estimations is that social capital discourages criminal
prosecution through the behavior of the judiciary, rather than of voters. A priori this
does not seem very likely, because the eﬀect might go in the opposite direction: more
zealous judges in districts with higher social capital might increase the likelihood of RAP’s,
not necessarily reduce it. Anyway, because of this concern, we now turn to absences, a
misbehavior that hurts the voters but does not correspond to any criminal wrongdoing.
4.2 Absenteeism rate
Table 6 has the same structure of Table 5, except that there is only one measure of
misbehavior in this sample of majoritarian politicians in the Second Republic. Moreover,
the speciﬁcation here includes more individual-speciﬁc variables, since this more recent
dataset has more information on the candidates, including the province of birth (instead
of simply the region). Finally, social capital and the other district-speciﬁc variables vary
over a larger number of areas, namely 92 provinces.
The results are qualitatively very similar to those obtained for RAP, although they
are more precisely estimated and social capital where elected remains always statistically
signiﬁcant. In particular, columns 1 and 2 refer to social capital in the province of election.
Absenteeismis always signiﬁcantly lower in districtswith more social capital. Inparticular,
according to the baseline speciﬁcation in column 1, an increase in social capital equal to its
standard deviation would reduce absences in parliamentary votes by about 14%. Moving
from the lowest to the average level of social capital would reduce absences by 17%, and
moving form the lowest to the highest level of social capital by 64%. A large newspapers
circulation also discourages absenteeism, but here unlike for RAP the estimated coeﬃcient
of social capital increase marginally when this additional regressor is included.
18Columns 3-6 try to disentangle the eﬀect of social capital in the province of election
versus the province of birth. As for RAP, the eﬀect of social capital where elected remains
large in absolute value and statistically signiﬁcant even with the inclusion of ﬁxed eﬀects
for the province of birth (column 3), or if both kinds of social capital are included in the
estimation with migrants only (column 6). The eﬀect of social capital at birth, on the
other hand, is not statistically signiﬁcant as soon as the province of election is controlled
for (column 5). Overall, therefore, these results support the inference that absenteeism
is discouraged by the social capital of voters—both directly and indirectly, through the
endogenous sorting of candidates in each district—rather than by inherited norms of the
candidates as measured by the social capital at birth.
Finally, in Table 7, we run the same set of estimations of Table 6 on the (closed-list)
proportional members of Parliament in the Second Republic legislative terms XII, XIII,
and XIV, in order to assess whether the same correlation between social capital and po-
litical misbehavior is at work also under institutions associated with a lower degree of
political accountability and higher rent-seeking (see Gagliarducci, Nannicini, and Natic-
chioni 2011). The results show no signiﬁcant correlation between the absenteeism rate
and both the social capital of election and birth of the members of Parliament. This
ﬁnding does not seem to be driven by the lower accuracy induced by the reduced sample
size, because point estimates, with the exclusion of column 6, are also much lower than
those on majoritarian members of Parliament. This negative result is important, because
it further reinforces the inference that social capital aﬀects misbehavior through political
accountability: the eﬀect of social capital is only present where political institutions allow
politicians to be held accountable.
5 Social capital and election outcomes
In line with our theoretical model, a plausible interpretation of the results in the previous
section is that uncivic voters fail to coordinate and keep politicians accountable to criteria
of aggregate welfare, so that political representativesface weaker incentivesto pursue social
welfare (or are poorly selected) in areas with less social capital. If this interpretation is
correct, we should see that voters in districts with high social capital are more willing to
punish incumbents who misbehaved, as indeed predicted by our model. This section tests
this hypothesis, again looking at how voters react to both RAP and absences.
19Starting with RAP, the basic speciﬁcation we estimate is:
∆V OTijt = δt + γj + τRAPijt · SCj + RAPijt · Z
0
jλ + θRAPijt + X
0
itβ + ￿ijt, (14)
where the dependent variable is the diﬀerence of log votes (∆V OTijt) received by incum-
bent i in district j between the elections at the end and beginning of term t. The coeﬃcient
of interest is τ, namely the eﬀect of social capital in the district of election interacted with
the corresponding RAP. We expect τ < 0: electoral punishment for misbehavior is harsher
where there is more social capital. Throughout we control for legislative term (δt) and
district (γj) ﬁxed eﬀects, individual features of the incumbent (X) and the interaction of
RAP with other district-speciﬁc variables Z (namely per-capita income, education, and
newspapers diﬀusion). Estimation is by OLS, and robust standard errors are clustered by
district. As in the previous section, we estimate (14) with two diﬀerent measures of RAP,
referring to general and serious oﬀenses, respectively.
Implicitly, with this speciﬁcation we assume that voters’ punishment is permanent,
that is, the incumbent is permanently punished for additional RAP’s received in the cur-
rent legislature. The advantage of this speciﬁcation is that, taking diﬀerences in preference
votes between two consecutive elections, we take care of unobserved and time-invariant
individual variables potentially correlated with RAP. Nevertheless, as an additional check,
we also estimate equation (14) by adding individual (legislator-speciﬁc) ﬁxed eﬀects. Un-
like in the reduced form regression of the previous section, here we are interested in the
eﬀect of the interaction RAPijt ·SCj, a variable that varies over both i and j; hence, even
in a regression with both individual and district ﬁxed eﬀects, we draw inferences from all
observations, and not just from the movers.
Precisely because we are interested in the interaction between RAP and social capital,
however, district and individual ﬁxed eﬀects do not entirely remove the problem of unob-
served variables that vary across both individuals and districts, and that might be corre-
lated with RAP. In particular, the estimation of equation (14) may suﬀer from a possible
self-selection problem into the treatment RAP. In the previous section, we have argued
that the evidence suggests that voters are more eﬀective in discouraging misbehavior in
districts with higher social capital, either because incumbents are more self-restrained, or
because politicians with a lower propensity to misbehave enter politics anticipating voters’
behavior. Here, this means that misbehavior by the incumbent is not random, but could
be systematically correlated with the error term of equation (14).
20As we are interested in estimating τ, this self-selection would be a major problem only
if the arising bias were diﬀerent in areas characterized by diﬀerent levels of social capital.
To control for that, as discussed in Appendix II, we should include a full set of interactions
between individual and district ﬁxed eﬀects. This speciﬁcation is too demanding for our
data. We therefore rely on an alternative speciﬁcation that may be described as a good
approximation, where we basically demote the degrees of freedom problem by reducing
social capital to a binary variable. In particular, we estimate equation (14) with (and
without) individual ﬁxed eﬀects and omitting the interaction variable (i.e., constraining
τ = 0), but in two diﬀerent samples: the districts with social capital above and below
the mean, respectively.17 We then test whether the estimated coeﬃcient on RAP (ˆ θ) is
the same in the two samples. Hence, in the speciﬁcation with individual ﬁxed eﬀects, the
identiﬁcation comes from politicians who have been repeatedly elected in areas with the
same social capital and have received a RAP in one term but not in another.
Furthermore, under plausible assumptions, the baseline speciﬁcation of equation (14)
estimates a lower bound of the true punishment τ (in absolute value), as the above source
of possible endogeneity works against us. Speciﬁcally, as discussed in Appendix II, we need
to assume that politicians who have improved their electoral prospects (and can therefore
better aﬀord to be punished) are more likely to misbehave in areas with high social cap-
ital than where social capital is low: in other words, where the expected punishment is
higher, only those who can better aﬀord the (electoral) price of receiving a RAP decide to
misbehave. Under this assumption, the estimated diﬀerence in the electoral punishment
between areas with high versus low social capital is smaller than the true diﬀerence, and
we estimate a lower bound (in absolute value).
An additional problem with equation (14) is non-random sample selection, as we only
observe preference votes for incumbents who choose to run for reelection. But incumbents
who obtained very severe RAP’s in districts where voters are very demanding might choose
to opt out of the election. Nevertheless, in the data, the decision of whether or not to run
for reelection is uncorrelated with RAP, social capital, and their interactions, suggesting
that this is not a serious problem.
To avoid this problem, however, in the sample of the Second Republic, where misbe-
havior is measured by absenteeism, we redeﬁne the dependent variable as being reelected
17Results are robust to the use of diﬀerent cutoﬀs: the median, the 25th, and the 75th percentile.
21in the same district (REELEijt). We thus estimate:
REELEijt = δt + γj + τYijt · SCj + λYijt · Zj + θYijt + X
0
ijtβ + ￿ijt (15)
where Yijt refers to absenteeism. Here, an incumbent who chooses not to run is coded
as not reelected, so that sample selection is not an issue. Estimation is by Probit, with
standard errors clustered by district. The speciﬁcation is otherwise the same as with RAP
in equation (14), except that in this sample we have a richer set of observable individual
features. An important reason why in this sample we can look at election outcomes, rather
than just preference votes, is that here the electoral rule is plurality rule in single-member
districts. Therefore, the link between votes and election outcomes is more powerful than
in the proportional electoral system with open lists of the First Republic, where the order
in the list is often the main determinant of the ﬁnal outcome.
This sample has a drawback relative to the First Republic, however: since there are
only two legislatures, the degrees of freedom problem is more severe when individual ﬁxed
eﬀects are included.
5.1 Criminal prosecutions
Table 8 reports the estimates of equation (14). Again, the upper panel refers to the general
and broader deﬁnition of RAP, while the lower panel refers to serious RAP. The coeﬃcient
of interest is that on the interaction between RAP and social capital (i.e., ˆ τ). Column
1 estimates the basic speciﬁcation, where RAP is interacted with social capital but not
with other district-speciﬁc variables. The estimated coeﬃcient of interest is negative and
statistically signiﬁcant, as expected, and the eﬀect is stronger in the case of serious RAP,
as one might also have expected. Column 2 adds the interactions between RAP and other
district-speciﬁc variables (per-capita income, education, newspapers diﬀusion). The eﬀect
of the interaction between RAP and social capital becomes even larger in absolute value
and gains signiﬁcance, in both panels.
According to the speciﬁcation in column 2, receiving a RAP is going to decrease the
amount of preference votes by 21% in areas with average social capital and by 28% in
areas with the highest level of social capital, while it has no signiﬁcant impact where
social capital is completely lacking. For serious RAP, the impact is minus 9% on average
and minus 56% in areas with the highest social capital, while it is again insigniﬁcant in
areas with the lowest social capital.
22The remaining two columns (3 and 4) repeat the same exercise but add individual ﬁxed
eﬀects. The estimated coeﬃcient of serious RAP interacted with social capital remains
stable and signiﬁcant, while that of general RAP interacted with social capital becomes
negligible and insigniﬁcant.
Table 9 estimates a similar speciﬁcation in the split sample, again for general and
serious RAP. Columns 1 and 3 refer to districtswith social capital above the mean, columns
2 and 4 to districts below the mean. We are interested in whether the estimated coeﬃcient
of RAP is diﬀerent in the two samples, as reported by the p-value of the Wald tests at
the bottom of each panel. The estimates are consistent with those of Table 8. When
individual ﬁxed eﬀects are omitted (columns 1 and 2), the diﬀerence between the two
samples is highly signiﬁcant, according to both deﬁnitions of RAP. When individual ﬁxed
eﬀects are included (columns 3 and 4), the diﬀerence in the estimated coeﬃcients of RAP
is statistically signiﬁcant only for serious RAP, although even in the general deﬁnition
the estimated coeﬃcient of RAP is only signiﬁcant and larger in absolute value in the
high social capital sample. Looking at our preferred speciﬁcation with individual ﬁxed
eﬀects, receiving a RAP approximately reduces preference votes by 12% in areas with
above-average social capital, while it has no impact in areas with below-average social
capital. Similarly, being prosecuted for serious crimes reduces preference votes by 25% in
areas with above-average social capital and has no impact in the others.
Finally, in Figures 5 and 6, we visually inspect whether our results are driven by
outlying electoral districts. Within each of the 32 districts we estimate the electoral
punishment of RAP and serious RAP controlling for individual-speciﬁc variables. We
then separately regress the electoral punishment on both social capital and the other
district-speciﬁc variables (Z). The ﬁgures plot the scatter and linear correlation between
the residuals of these last two regressions, that is, the correlation between the electoral
punishment of political misbehavior and social capital partialling out the impact of other
district-speciﬁc characteristics. The negative correlation is always highly signiﬁcant and
does not appear to be driven by outliers.
Overall, the above estimates are in line with the theoretical priors and suggest that
indeed voters in districts with high social capital are more willing to punish political
misbehavior, especially when it involves prosecution for serious crimes.
235.2 Absenteeism rate
Table 10 reports the estimates of equation (15). The coeﬃcient of interest is that on
the interaction between the absenteeism rate and social capital (ˆ τ). In the speciﬁcation
of column 1, absenteeism is interacted with social capital but not with other district-
speciﬁc variables. The estimated coeﬃcient of interest is again negative and statistically
signiﬁcant. As in the case of RAP, when we add the interactions between absenteeism
and other district-speciﬁc variables in column 2, the eﬀect of the interaction between
absenteeism and social capital becomes even larger in absolute value. For the sake of
completeness, we also report the estimates with individual ﬁxed eﬀects in columns 3 and
4, but they are inconclusive, perhaps because of the low amount of within variation as
the panel consists of only two legislative terms in the Second Republic. According to
the speciﬁcation in column 2, the eﬀect of shirking parliamentary duties on reelection
is positive (although insigniﬁcant) where there is no social capital. An increase in the
absenteeism rate equal to its standard deviation reduces the probability of being reelected
in the same (single-member) district by 1 percentage point (about 2%) in areas with
average social capital, and by 22 percentage points (about 70%) in areas with the highest
level of social capital.18
Table 11 further looks at the association between the electoral punishment of shirking
and social capital using the split-sample speciﬁcation. As for RAP, columns 1 and 3 refer
to districts with social capital above the mean, columns 2 and 4 to districts below the
mean. We are interested in whether the estimated coeﬃcient of the absenteeism rate is
diﬀerent in the two samples, as reported by the p-value of the Wald test. When individual
ﬁxed eﬀects are omitted (columns 1 and 2), the diﬀerence between the two samples has
the expected sign and is highly signiﬁcant. In particular, an increase in the absenteeism
rate equal to its standard deviation reduces the probability of being reelected in the same
(single-member) district by 24 percentage point (about 42%) in areas with above-average
social capital, and it has a positive (although insigniﬁcant) eﬀect in areas with below-
average social capital. When individual ﬁxed eﬀects are included (columns 3 and 4), the
diﬀerence in the estimated coeﬃcients of absenteeism has no longer the expected sign, but
18Using reelection—instead of reelection in the same district—as dependent variable in the estimation of
equation (15) provides results that are similar in terms of statistical signiﬁcance but lower in magnitude
(available upon requests). This means that political parties may decide to “save” some misbehaving
politicians by letting them run for reelection in a diﬀerent electoral district.
24it is statistically insigniﬁcant according to the Wald test.
In Figure 7, we visually inspect whether the above results are driven by outlying
provinces of election. Looking at the 92 Italian provinces in our sample, we repeat the
two-step estimation strategy implemented for RAP and serious RAP in Figures 5 and
6, respectively. The correlation between the electoral punishment of shirking and social
capital—partialling out the impact of other district-speciﬁc characteristics—is negative
(as expected), highly signiﬁcant, and does not appear to be driven by outliers.
Overall, although the limited panel dimension of the Second Republic sample ham-
pers the consistent implementation of the speciﬁcations with individual ﬁxed eﬀects, the
available empirical evidence is again in line with the theoretical priors and suggests that
members of Parliament elected in districts with high social capital cannot safely expect
to shirk their duties without being punished in terms of reelection probability.
Finally, in Table 12 and Table 13, we look at the electoral punishment of the absen-
teeism rate of proportional politicians in the Second Republic. As expected, in a context
where voters’ degrees of freedom in choosing their preferred candidates are severely ham-
pered by the closed party lists, the interaction between social capital and absences is never
statistically signiﬁcant. Indeed, politicians who are elected in the proportional tier and
make more absences end up being rewarded with a higher reelection probability (see Table
13), but this eﬀect is not statistically diﬀerent in areas with high versus low social capi-
tal. Figure 8 further shows the lack of any signiﬁcant correlation between social capital
and the (partialled-out) punishment of political misbehavior for proportional politicians.
Again, this negative result supports the inference that social capital discourages misbe-
havior through political accountability, because the correlation between voting patterns
and social capital is only present where political institutions keep politicians accountable.
6 Further robustness checks
In this section we assess the robustness of the results to alternative indicators of social
capital, replicating the baseline speciﬁcations using a composite measure of social capital
instead of blood donations. In particular, we extract the ﬁrst principal component from
the following set of indicators used in the literature to measure social capital: the number
of non-proﬁt organizations per capita; the number of employeesin non-proﬁt organizations
per capita; the average turnout in national elections, European elections, and referenda
25during the 1990s (see Section 3 on the data sources).19 In Panel A of Table 14, we re-
estimate equation (11) both without (ﬁrst row) and with (second row) newspapers diﬀusion
as an additional control variable. The estimated marginal eﬀects capture the association
of the composite index of social capital with RAP (ﬁrst column), serious RAP (second
column), and the absenteeism rate (third column). All of the estimates conﬁrm a negative
and statistically signiﬁcant impact of social capital on political misbehavior.
In Panel B of Table 14, we re-estimate either equation (14) in the ﬁrst and second
column, or equation (15) in the third column, to assess whether the composite index of
social capital has a positive impact on the electoral punishment of RAP, serious RAP, and
absences. The reported coeﬃcients are those of the interaction term between social capital
and each political misbehavior (ˆ τ). In the ﬁrst row, we do not control for the interaction
between political misbehavior and newspapers diﬀusion (and the other district-speciﬁc
covariates Z), while in the second row we do. Again, all of the estimates conﬁrm the
results we obtained for blood donations: The higher is social capital, the harsher is the
electoral loss associated with our measures of political misbehavior.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have investigated the impact of civic attitudes on political account-
ability. In a simple theoretical model, a larger fraction of civic voters discourages moral
hazard by political representatives. This result is consistent with the evidence. Using
data on Italian members of Parliament in the postwar period, we have shown that polit-
ical misbehavior—measured by both criminal prosecution and absenteeism in Parliament
votes—is negatively correlated with the social capital of the district where politicians were
elected. More importantly, the electoral punishment of political misbehavior is consider-
ably more pronounced in districts with high social capital. We interpret this as evidence
that civic attitudes on the part of voters are an important factor in keeping elected oﬃcials
accountable for their actions.
Our ﬁndings can thus explain why political corruption and clientelism seem to be much
more prevalent in countries and regions with low social capital. If voters fail to coordinate
in punishing political misbehavior, their elected representatives face weaker incentives to
19The estimated ﬁrst principal component ranges from -2.13 to 1.64, with an average value of -0.18 and
a standard deviation of 0.91. Its correlation with blood donations is 0.62.
26pursue social welfare. Moreover, political representatives are less likely to be selected
on criteria of honesty and general competence. Our results also point to an interaction
between social capital and institutions in keeping politicians accountable. Indeed, the
negative correlation we detect between political misbehavior (or the electoral punishment
of political misbehavior) and social capital is at work only for politicians elected either
under open-list proportional representation or in majoritarian (single-member) districts,
while it is not present under closed-list proportional representation, where the scope for
holding politicians accountable is much more limited.
Finally, our empirical results are also consistent with an alternative interpretation:
Political accountability fails where there is low social capital not because voters have the
wrong value system, but because in such districts the political opponent is also corrupt
(that is, voters have no alternative). This explanation cannot be entirely ruled out, but it
is not very convincing because the pool of potential political candidates is large. Moreover,
in such a situation, national political parties would have very strong incentives to place
honest candidates precisely in the districts where they are most needed, and likewise
individuals with a strong reputation for honesty would face sharp incentives to oppose
corrupt or misbehaving politicians.
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29Appendix I: Main oﬀenses included in the measures of
criminal prosecution (RAP and serious RAP)
List of serious oﬀenses included in both the deﬁnition of RAP and serious
RAP:
(1) corruption; (2) private interest in oﬃcial acts or oﬃcial duties; (3) tax evasion, tax
dodging; (4) violation of the new laws on combating criminality, criminal conspiracy,
confederation to commit a crime, racketeering organization; (5) trade fraud; (6) abuse,
word of abuse; (7) forgery in public acts and public duties; (8) handling (receiving) stolen
goods; (9) homicide, murder; (10) attempted domestic violence (brutality); violence or
threat to public oﬃcer; (11) criminal damage; damage of public building; (12) defamation,
insult, libel; false allegations; (13) bouncing a check; (14) embezzlement of public property
or public funds.
List of other oﬀenses included only in the deﬁnition of RAP:
(15) unlawful assembly; disturbance in an election meeting; (16) destruction or damage to
bill-posting; unlawful bill-posting; (17) road-traﬃc oﬀenses; (18) impediment, hindrance,
or obstruction to free movement; (19) instigation to fascism; (20) bodily injury; (21) con-
tempt (oltraggio a pubblico uﬃciale); (22) publication or spreading false news; (23) (un-
lawful) interruption of public utility; (24) destruction of propaganda placards or notices;
breach of the rules on electoral propaganda.
30Appendix II: Nature and direction of self-selection bias
Using a potential-outcome framework, deﬁne ∆V OTi(1) as the potential outcome of politi-
cian i in case he received a RAP, and ∆V OTi(0) as the potential outcome in case he did
not receive a RAP.20 Conditional on the level of social capital of the district of election
(SC = k, with k = H,L and H > L), potential outcomes can be written as:
∆V OTik(1) = µ1k + Uik(1)
∆V OTik(0) = µ0k + Uik(0),
where µ1k−µ0k captures the common electoral punishment for receiving a RAP in district
k and Uik(1) − Uik(0) is the idiosyncratic punishment of individual i in district k.
If we regress the observed outcome on the received RAP by OLS within every district
(or we control for district ﬁxed eﬀects in a saturated model), the estimated coeﬃcient
provides a biased estimate of the average treatment eﬀect on the treated in district k,
which can be expressed as: τk = E[∆V OTik(1) − ∆V OTik(0)|RAP = 1,SC = k]. In
particular, the mean selection bias is:
MSBk = E[Uik(0)|RAP = 1,SC = k] − E[Uik(0)|RAP = 0,SC = k],
that is, the average idiosyncratic electoral outcome in the case of no treatment for politi-
cians who end up receiving a RAP and politicians who do not receive it, respectively. A
positive value of MSBk means that, on average in district k, individuals with improved
electoral prospects if they remained honest (Uik(0) high) are more likely to misbehave
(RAP = 1) than individuals whose electoral prospects have worsened (Uik(0) low); in
other words, misbehavior is more likely amongst those who can aﬀord to lose votes be-
cause their electoral prospects are expected to improve. Conversely, MSBk < 0 means
that political misbehavior is more likely amongst those whose electoral prospects would
have deteriorated even if they had remained honest. Note also that the idiosyncratic error
term Uik refers to changes in preference votes relative to the previous election, since we
are taking ﬁrst diﬀerences.
As we are interested in the comparison between τk in districts characterized by diﬀerent
levelsof social capital, assuming that the idiosyncratic electoral outcomes of each politician
are constant across time, we could remove the mean selection bias in each district by
including politician ﬁxed eﬀects within every district (or by saturating the model with a
full set of interactions between politician and district ﬁxed eﬀects).
If we cannot do that because of data restrictions, however, we can still predict the
direction of the bias when comparing the estimated treated eﬀects in districts with high
20We summarize the main identiﬁcation issues in the framework of the First Republic, i.e., with the log
diﬀerence of preference votes as outcome variable and RAP as treatment of interest. The reasoning easily
extends to the Second Republic framework, with reelection as outcome and absenteeism as treatment.
31versus low social capital. In particular, the estimated diﬀerence between the electoral
punishment/reward of RAP in areas with high versus low social capital is made up of
both the true diﬀerence and the diﬀerence between the mean selection biases in the two
areas:
ˆ τH − ˆ τL = (τH − τL) + (MSBH − MSBL)
Clearly, if MSBk is the same in all districts k, or if it does not covary systematically with
social capital, then our estimates are unbiased. Thus, we are only concerned by MSB that
varies systematically with social capital. Given that we have taken ﬁrst diﬀerences (i.e.,
as explained above, MSB refers to unobservable changes in electoral prospects between
two consecutive elections), it is not obvious why there would be a speciﬁc correlation with
time invariant features of the district.
If MSB covaries systematically with social capital, then we can estimate either a lower
or an upper bound, depending on the patterns of correlations. Assume ﬁrst that the true
diﬀerence is negative, (τH − τL) < 0, meaning that the electoral punishment of RAP is
higher (or the electoral reward is lower) in areas with more social capital. Then, as long
as the mean selection bias is larger in districts with high social capital, MSBH > MSBL,
the estimated diﬀerence in the electoral punishments is going to be a lower bound of the
true diﬀerence in absolute value. In fact, we have either (τH − τL) < 0 < (ˆ τH − ˆ τL) or
(τH − τL) < (ˆ τH − ˆ τL) < 0. The latter is indeed our case, as (ˆ τH − ˆ τL) < 0 in the data.21
At the end of the day, to obtain a lower bound interpretation of our estimates, we need
to assume that, where social capital is high, politicians with improved electoral prospects
without RAP are more likely to self-select into RAP, compared to districts with low social
capital: in other words, where the expected punishment is higher, only those who can
aﬀord the (electoral) price of receiving a RAP decide to misbehave. Of course, we would
obtain an upper bound interpretation with the opposite assumption, namely that—where
the expected punishment is higher—only those who are desperate and would end up not
being reelected anyway decide to misbehave. We believe that the lower bound assumption
is plausible in our context, where most incumbents eﬀectively compete for reelection,
although we cannot completely rule out the opposite hypothesis.
21Alternatively, if (τH −τL) > 0, the punishment of RAP would be higher (or the reward lower) in areas
with less social capital. In this case, as long as MSBH > MSBL, the estimated diﬀerence would be an
upper bound of the true diﬀerence: (ˆ τH − ˆ τL) > (τH −τL) > 0. This is not the case in our data, however.
32Tables and Figures












Total (“First Republic” sample) 5,849
XII (1994–1996) 618
XIII (1996–2001) 596
Total (“Second Republic” sample) 1,214
Notes. Non-missing observations across legislative terms since
1948. “First Republic” sample: House of Representativesonly.
“Second Republic” sample: House of Representativesand Sen-
ate; majoritarian members of Parliament only. The XI legisla-
tive term (1992–94) marks the transition from the First to the
Second Republic, and it is droppedbecausemembers of Parlia-
ment were (re)elected under a diﬀerent electoral system in the
XII term. The XIV legislative term (2001–2006) is dropped
because members of Parliament were (re)elected under a dif-
ferent electoral system in the XV term.
33Table 2: Individual characteristics of members of Parliament – First Republic
Mean S.d. Min Max Obs.
Male 0.93 0.25 0.00 1.00 5,849
Age 48.33 9.44 18.00 98.00 5,849
Years of schooling 15.24 5.30 0.00 21.00 5,849
Government appointment 0.16 0.36 0.00 1.00 5,849
Local experience 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00 5,849
Freshman 0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00 5,849
Majority coalition 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 5,849
Migrant 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 5,849
Lawyer 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00 5,849
Executive 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 5,849
Politician 0.17 0.37 0.00 1.00 5,849
Entrepreneur 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 5,849
Teacher 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 5,849
Physician 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 5,849
RAP 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 5,849
Serious RAP 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 5,849
Candidate 0.70 0.46 0.00 1.00 5,849
Reelected 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 5,849
Notes. All variables are dummies, except Age (in years) and Years of schoolingb. Government appointment
includes ministers and vice-ministers. Local experience stands for previous government experience at the local
level (e.g., mayor). Freshman means that the previous parliamentarytenure is zero. Majority coalition identiﬁes
the government coalition. Migrant identiﬁes politicians elected in a province diﬀerent from that of birth. Job
dummies refer to the preelection occupation. RAP is equal to one if the politician receives a request for the
removal of parliamentary immunity because suspected of criminal wrongdoing. Serious RAP refers to a request
for serious crimes (see Appendix I). Candidate is equal to one if the member of Parliament stands for reelection
in the next term. Reelected is equal to one if the member of Parliament wins the bid for reelection.
34Table 3: Individual characteristics of members of Parliament – Second Republic
Mean S.d. Min Max Obs.
Male 0.92 0.28 0.00 1.00 1,214
Married 0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00 1,214
No. of children 1.53 1.20 0.00 9.00 1,214
Age 49.50 9.44 27.00 84.00 1,214
Years of schooling 16.11 2.43 5.00 20.00 1,214
National politician 0.25 0.44 0.00 1.00 1,214
Government appointment 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 1,214
Parliament appointment 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 1,214
Local experience 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00 1,214
Freshman 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 1,214
Majority coalition 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00 1,214
Migrant 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 1,214
Lawyer 0.14 0.34 0.00 1.00 1,214
Executive 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00 1,214
Politician 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 1,214
Entrepreneur 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 1,214
Teacher 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 1,214
Self-employed 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 1,214
Physician 0.10 0.29 0.00 1.00 1,214
Preelection income 0.12 0.35 0.00 11.32 1,214
Absenteeism rate 0.36 0.24 0.00 0.98 1,214
Reelected 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 1,214
Reelected same district 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00 1,214
Notes. All variables are dummies, except No. of children, Age (in years), Years of schooling, and Preelection
income (in million of Euros, 2004 prices). National politician stands for being a member of the party executive
committee at the national level. Government appointment includes ministers and vice-ministers. Parliament
appointment captures whether the politician is president or vice-president of the Parliament, or of a single com-
mittee. Local experience stands for previous government experience at the local level (e.g., mayor). Freshman
means that the previous parliamentary tenure is zero. Majority coalition identiﬁes the government coalition.
Migrant identiﬁes politicians elected in a province diﬀerent from that of birth. Job dummies refer to the preelec-
tion occupation. Preelection income is the total gross income in the last year before being elected. Absenteeism
rate is the percentage of votes missed without any legitimate reason during the legislative term. Reelected
and Reelected same district (with the latter referring to single-member districts in majoritarian elections) are
dummies equal to one if the politician wins the bid for reelection. Majoritarian members of Parliament only.
Table 4: Social capital measure and other characteristics of Italian provinces
Mean S.d. Min Max Blood Income Education Newspapers
Blood donation 2.80 2.21 0.00 10.52 1.00
Income 15.33 3.21 10.04 20.72 0.52 1.00
Education 31.70 3.41 25.10 46.29 -0.32 0.06 1.00
Newspapers 7.91 3.90 1.94 17.54 0.33 0.69 0.11 1.00
Notes. The left panel reports descriptivestatistics of the variables; the right panel reports the correlationcoeﬃcients between
them. Blood donation is the number of blood bags (about 16oz) every 100 inhabitants in 1995 (source: Guiso, Sapienza,
and Zingales 2004). Income is per-capita income in 2003, measured in thousand of Euros (source: Istat). Education is the
share of people over 19 with a high-school degree in 2003, expressed in percentage points (source: Istat). Newspapers is the
diﬀusion of non-sport newspapers every 100 inhabitants in 2001–2002 (source: Cartocci 2007). Number of provinces: 92.
35Table 5: The impact of social capital on malfeasance – First Republic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: RAP
Social capital of election -0.017*** -0.010** -0.017** -0.027***
[0.004] [0.005] [0.007] [0.008]




Years of schooling -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.004]
Government appointment -0.066*** -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.066*** -0.065*** -0.062*
[0.015] [0.015] [0.016] [0.016] [0.015] [0.034]
Local experience 0.019 0.020 0.019 0.017 0.021 -0.011
[0.020] [0.021] [0.020] [0.021] [0.021] [0.029]
Freshman -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.048*** -0.050*** -0.049*** -0.083***
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.025]
Majority coalition -0.099*** -0.100*** -0.097*** -0.096*** -0.099*** -0.126***
[0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.017] [0.032]
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of birth dummies No No Yes No No No
District of election dummies No No No No Yes No
Obs. 5,849 5,849 5,849 5,849 5,849 1,217
Dependent variable: Serious RAP
Social capital of election -0.004*** -0.001 -0.003 -0.004
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.003]




Years of schooling 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Government appointment -0.010* -0.010* -0.011* -0.010* -0.010* -0.001
[0.006] [0.006] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.019]
Local experience 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.004 -0.006
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.013]
Freshman -0.007* -0.007* -0.007* -0.007* -0.007* -0.007
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.011]
Majority coalition -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.041**
[0.007] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.017]
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of birth dummies No No Yes No No No
District of election dummies No No No No Yes No
Obs. 5,849 5,849 5,849 5,849 5,849 1,217
Notes. Probit estimations; marginal eﬀects reported. Estimation (6) is restricted to migrants (i.e., politicians elected in a
region diﬀerent from that of birth). Dependent variables: dummy equal to one if the politician received a request for the
removal of parliamentary immunity because suspected of any criminal wrongdoing (RAP), or because suspected of a serious
crime (Serious RAP). Social capital is measured as blood donation. Other control variables include: age, age squared,
legislative term dummies, job dummies, district-speciﬁc income and education, macro-region dummies (North-West, North-
East, Center, South, Islands). Robust standard errors clustered at the district of election level are in brackets. Signiﬁcance
at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
36Table 6: The impact of social capital on the absenteeism rate of majoritarian members of
Parliament – Second Republic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Absenteeism rate
Social capital of election -0.022*** -0.024*** -0.029*** -0.019*
[0.005] [0.004] [0.006] [0.011]




Years of schooling 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.026***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.007]
National politician 0.036** 0.035** 0.032** 0.034** 0.038*** 0.101***
[0.015] [0.015] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.032]
Government appointment 0.045* 0.046** 0.041 0.049* 0.040 -0.039
[0.023] [0.023] [0.025] [0.026] [0.028] [0.053]
Parliament appointment 0.046** 0.049** 0.047** 0.049** 0.055** 0.014
[0.022] [0.022] [0.023] [0.024] [0.025] [0.038]
Local experience -0.012 -0.012 -0.015 -0.011 -0.019 -0.016
[0.012] [0.012] [0.013] [0.014] [0.014] [0.028]
Freshman -0.030* -0.031** -0.035** -0.028* -0.034** -0.017
[0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.014] [0.033]
Majority coalition -0.161*** -0.162*** -0.167*** -0.160*** -0.169*** -0.193***
[0.014] [0.014] [0.015] [0.014] [0.014] [0.032]
Preelection income 0.074*** 0.075*** 0.078*** 0.076*** 0.070*** 0.064***
[0.027] [0.028] [0.026] [0.020] [0.020] [0.012]
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province of birth dummies No No Yes No No No
Province of election dummies No No No No Yes No
Obs. 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214 248
Notes. OLS estimations. Members of Parliament elected in the majoritarian tier of the mixed-member electoral system only.
Estimation (6) is further restricted to migrants (i.e., politicians elected in a region diﬀerent from that of birth). Dependent
variable: absenteeism rate (i.e., percentage of votes missed without any legitimate reason during the term). Social capital is
measured as blood donation. Other control variables include: age, age squared, married, number of children, legislative term
dummies, job dummies, district-speciﬁc income and education, macro-region dummies (North-West, North-East, Center,
South, Islands). Robust standard errors clustered at the province of election level are in brackets. Signiﬁcance at the 10%
level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
37Table 7: The impact of social capital on the absenteeism rate of proportional members of
Parliament – Second Republic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Absenteeism rate
Social capital of election -0.007 -0.010 -0.007 0.025
[0.006] [0.006] [0.008] [0.021]




Years of schooling -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003
[0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.008]
National politician 0.011 0.011 0.014 0.010 0.010 0.001
[0.025] [0.025] [0.027] [0.023] [0.024] [0.038]
Government appointment 0.061 0.061 0.059 0.063 0.064 0.023
[0.069] [0.069] [0.071] [0.045] [0.046] [0.071]
Parliament appointment 0.027 0.027 0.019 0.026 0.028 -0.068
[0.029] [0.029] [0.032] [0.030] [0.032] [0.058]
Local experience -0.024 -0.024 -0.024 -0.021 -0.020 -0.013
[0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.017] [0.019] [0.047]
Freshman -0.029 -0.029 -0.034 -0.030 -0.029 -0.061
[0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.029] [0.028] [0.044]
Majority coalition -0.212*** -0.212*** -0.209*** -0.213*** -0.211*** -0.131***
[0.023] [0.024] [0.024] [0.023] [0.021] [0.040]
Preelection income 0.084** 0.084** 0.083** 0.086 0.084 0.042
[0.037] [0.037] [0.038] [0.051] [0.050] [0.053]
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province of birth dummies No No Yes No No No
Province of election dummies No No No No Yes No
Obs. 595 595 595 595 595 163
Notes. OLS estimations. Members of Parliament elected in the proportional tier of the mixed-member electoral system only.
Estimation (6) is further restricted to migrants (i.e., politicians elected in a region diﬀerent from that of birth). Dependent
variable: absenteeism rate (i.e., percentage of votes missed without any legitimate reason during the term). Social capital is
measured as blood donation. Other control variables include: age, age squared, married, number of children, legislative term
dummies, job dummies, district-speciﬁc income and education, macro-region dummies (North-West, North-East, Center,
South, Islands). Robust standard errors clustered at the province of election level are in brackets. Signiﬁcance at the 10%
level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
38Table 8: Social capital and the electoral punishment of malfeasance (A) – First Republic
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Log diﬀerence of votes
RAP -0.014 -0.148 -0.040 0.111
[0.033] [0.256] [0.059] [0.517]
RAP × social capital -0.015* -0.022** -0.009 0.005
[0.009] [0.011] [0.020] [0.029]
Years of schooling 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
[0.002] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000]
Government appointment 0.148*** 0.149*** 0.054 0.057*
[0.023] [0.023] [0.034] [0.034]
Local experience 0.006 0.005 0.000 0.000
[0.018] [0.018] [0.000] [0.000]
Freshman 0.074*** 0.075*** 0.088*** 0.087***
[0.018] [0.018] [0.031] [0.031]
Majority coalition 0.028 0.030 -0.037 -0.040
[0.018] [0.018] [0.064] [0.064]
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
District of election dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
RAP × Zj No Yes No Yes
Individual ﬁxed eﬀects No No Yes Yes
Obs. 3,913 3,913 3,913 3,913
Dependent variable: Log diﬀerence of votes
Serious RAP 0.088** 0.081 0.064 0.734
[0.039] [0.397] [0.069] [0.579]
Serious RAP × social capital -0.045*** -0.061*** -0.064*** -0.058*
[0.012] [0.015] [0.023] [0.033]
Years of schooling 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000
[0.002] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000]
Government appointment 0.152*** 0.152*** 0.052 0.056*
[0.023] [0.023] [0.034] [0.034]
Local experience 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.000
[0.017] [0.017] [0.000] [0.000]
Freshman 0.076*** 0.077*** 0.089*** 0.088***
[0.018] [0.017] [0.030] [0.030]
Majority coalition 0.034* 0.033* -0.036 -0.037
[0.019] [0.019] [0.063] [0.063]
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
District of election dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Serious RAP × Zj No Yes No Yes
Individual ﬁxed eﬀects No No Yes Yes
Obs. 3,913 3,913 3,913 3,913
Notes. OLS estimations. Dependent variable: log diﬀerence of number of votes (between past and future elections); mem-
bers of Parliament who run for reelection only. RAP is equal to one if the politician receives a request for the removal of
parliamentary immunity because suspected of criminal wrongdoing. Serious RAP refers to a request for serious crimes (see
Appendix I). Other control variables include: age, age squared, legislative term dummies, job dummies, macro-region dum-
mies (North-West, North-East, Center, South, Islands). The district-speciﬁc characteristics Zj include: income, education,
and newspapers. Social capital is measured as blood donation. Robust standard errors clustered at the district of election
level are in brackets. Signiﬁcance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
39Table 9: Social capital and the electoral punishment of malfeasance (B) – First Republic
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Above-mean Below-mean Above-mean Below-mean
social capital social capital social capital social capital
Dependent variable: Log diﬀerence of votes
RAP -0.108** -0.019 -0.116* -0.035
[0.037] [0.025] [0.060] [0.044]
Years of schooling 0.002 -0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.003] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000]
Government appointment 0.138*** 0.151*** 0.106* 0.024
[0.041] [0.030] [0.058] [0.042]
Local experience -0.026 0.027 0.000 0.000
[0.026] [0.024] [0.000] [0.000]
Freshman 0.083** 0.064** 0.087* 0.072*
[0.028] [0.026] [0.048] [0.040]
Majority coalition 0.021 0.040 0.022 -0.148
[0.037] [0.024] [0.089] [0.092]
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
District of election dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual ﬁxed eﬀects No No Yes Yes
Obs. 1,645 2,268 1,645 2,268
Wald test p-value 0.025 0.226
Dependent variable: Log diﬀerence of votes
Serious RAP -0.139** 0.042 -0.247*** -0.005
[0.056] [0.035] [0.072] [0.052]
Years of schooling 0.002 -0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.003] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000]
Government appointment 0.142*** 0.154*** 0.103* 0.024
[0.042] [0.029] [0.057] [0.042]
Local experience -0.025 0.023 0.000 0.000
[0.027] [0.023] [0.000] [0.000]
Freshman 0.085*** 0.067** 0.088* 0.075*
[0.027] [0.026] [0.048] [0.040]
Majority coalition 0.028 0.045* 0.018 -0.148
[0.037] [0.024] [0.088] [0.092]
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
District of election dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual ﬁxed eﬀects No No Yes Yes
Obs. 1,645 2,268 1,645 2,268
Wald test p-value 0.003 0.004
Notes. OLS estimations in diﬀerent subsamples (districts with social capital above/below mean); social capital is measured
as blood donation. Dependent variable: log diﬀerence of number of votes (between past and future elections); members of
Parliamentwho run for reelectiononly. RAP is equalto oneif the politicianreceivesa requestfor the removal of parliamentary
immunity because suspected of criminal wrongdoing. Serious RAP refers to a request for serious crimes (see Appendix I).
Other control variables include: age, age squared, legislative term dummies, job dummies, macro-region dummies (North-
West, North-East, Center, South, Islands). The Wald test evaluates whether the coeﬃcient of the absenteeism rate is
diﬀerent in the two subsamples (above/below mean). Robust standard errors clustered at the district of election level are in
brackets. Signiﬁcance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
40Table 10: Social capital and the electoral punishment of the absenteeism rate of majori-
tarian members of Parliament (A) – Second Republic
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Reelected same district
Absenteeism rate 0.066 0.297 -0.708* -3.037
[0.109] [0.568] [0.382] [1.914]
Absenteeism rate × social capital -0.087** -0.117** 0.107 0.086
[0.035] [0.054] [0.096] [0.127]
Years of schooling 0.012 0.012 0.051 0.063
[0.008] [0.008] [0.057] [0.058]
National politician -0.013 -0.012 -0.267*** -0.262***
[0.036] [0.036] [0.095] [0.096]
Government appointment 0.054 0.054 -0.020 -0.015
[0.067] [0.067] [0.126] [0.128]
Parliament appointment 0.057 0.054 0.100 0.071
[0.047] [0.047] [0.089] [0.092]
Local experience 0.098*** 0.099*** 0.184 0.197
[0.031] [0.030] [0.128] [0.129]
Freshman -0.032 -0.032 -0.089 -0.091
[0.034] [0.034] [0.083] [0.084]
Majority coalition -0.202*** -0.202*** -0.111** -0.098*
[0.035] [0.035] [0.055] [0.057]
Preelection income -0.006 -0.006 -0.781 -0.751
[0.032] [0.033] [0.571] [0.573]
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province of election dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Absenteeism rate × Zj No Yes No Yes
Individual ﬁxed eﬀects No No Yes Yes
Obs. 1,214 1,214 1,214 1,214
Notes. Probit estimations; marginal eﬀects reported. Members of Parliament elected in the majoritarian tier of the mixed-
member electoral system only. Dependent variable: dummy equal to one if the member of Parliament is reelected in the
same (majoritarian) district in the next term. Absenteeism rate is the percentage of votes missed without any legitimate
reason during the legislative term. Other control variables include: age, age squared, married, number of children, legislative
term dummies, job dummies, macro-regiondummies (North-West, North-East, Center, South, Islands). The district-speciﬁc
characteristics Zj include: income, education, and newspapers. Social capital is measured as blood donation. Robust
standard errors clustered at the province of election level are in brackets. Signiﬁcance at the 10% level is represented by *,
at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
41Table 11: Social capital and the electoral punishment of the absenteeism rate of majori-
tarian members of Parliament (B) – Second Republic
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Above-mean Below-mean Above-mean Below-mean
social capital social capital social capital social capital
Dependent variable: Reelected same district
Absenteeism rate -0.558*** 0.131 -0.410 -0.669*
[0.123] [0.098] [0.588] [0.383]
Years of schooling 0.011 0.011 0.002 0.098
[0.012] [0.010] [0.138] [0.068]
National politician 0.048 -0.101** -0.324* -0.258**
[0.043] [0.049] [0.164] [0.126]
Government appointment 0.106 0.053 0.053 -0.073
[0.105] [0.076] [0.239] [0.155]
Parliament appointment 0.018 0.142* 0.081 0.105
[0.071] [0.075] [0.140] [0.124]
Local experience 0.049 0.129*** 0.348 0.147
[0.054] [0.048] [0.226] [0.165]
Freshman 0.005 -0.104** 0.009 -0.116
[0.051] [0.052] [0.152] [0.113]
Majority coalition -0.387*** -0.045 -0.211* -0.094
[0.058] [0.067] [0.120] [0.067]
Preelection income 0.415*** -0.108 1.145 -1.197*
[0.118] [0.220] [1.418] [0.636]
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province of election dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual ﬁxed eﬀects No No Yes Yes
Obs. 616 598 616 598
Wald test p-value 0.014 0.205
Notes. Probitestimationsin diﬀerentsubsamples(provinceswith social capitalabove/belowmean); socialcapitalis measured
as blood donation; marginal eﬀects reported. Members of Parliament elected in the majoritarian tier of the mixed-member
electoral system only. Dependent variable: dummy equal to one if the member of Parliament is reelected in the same
(majoritarian) district in the next term. Absenteeism rate is the percentage of votes missed without any legitimate reason
during the legislative term. Other control variables include: age, age squared, married, number of children, legislative term
dummies, job dummies, macro-region dummies (North-West, North-East, Center, South, Islands). Robust standard errors
clustered at the province of election level are in brackets. The Wald test evaluates whether the coeﬃcient of the absenteeism
rate is diﬀerent in the two subsamples (above/below mean). Signiﬁcance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5%
level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
42Table 12: Social capital and the electoral punishment of the absenteeism rate of propor-
tional members of Parliament (A) – Second Republic
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Reelected same district
Absenteeism rate 0.411** -0.796 0.537 -2.061
[0.167] [1.506] [0.369] [2.989]
Absenteeism rate × social capital -0.030 -0.045 -0.141 -0.299
[0.045] [0.093] [0.107] [0.237]
Years of schooling 0.013 0.013 0.158 0.137
[0.011] [0.011] [0.113] [0.124]
National politician 0.119** 0.117** 0.091 0.081
[0.049] [0.049] [0.142] [0.154]
Government appointment 0.029 0.022 -0.138 -0.111
[0.105] [0.105] [0.161] [0.173]
Parliament appointment 0.019 0.023 -0.270* -0.218
[0.068] [0.068] [0.151] [0.170]
Local experience 0.023 0.026 -0.694 -0.717
[0.049] [0.049] [0.460] [0.466]
Freshman -0.066 -0.067 0.077 0.089
[0.049] [0.049] [0.148] [0.153]
Majority coalition 0.080 0.080 0.056 0.062
[0.054] [0.055] [0.099] [0.103]
Preelection income 0.325** 0.328** -0.200 -0.225
[0.158] [0.160] [0.246] [0.251]
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province of election dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Absenteeism rate × Zj No Yes No Yes
Individual ﬁxed eﬀects No No Yes Yes
Obs. 595 595 595 595
Notes. Probit estimations; marginal eﬀects reported. Members of Parliament elected in the proportional tier of the mixed-
member electoral system only. Dependent variable: dummy equal to one if the member of Parliament is reelected in the
same (majoritarian) district in the next term. Absenteeism rate is the percentage of votes missed without any legitimate
reason during the legislative term. Other control variables include: age, age squared, married, number of children, legislative
term dummies, job dummies, macro-regiondummies (North-West, North-East, Center, South, Islands). The district-speciﬁc
characteristics Zj include: income, education, and newspapers. Social capital is measured as blood donation. Robust
standard errors clustered at the province of election level are in brackets. Signiﬁcance at the 10% level is represented by *,
at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
43Table 13: Social capital and the electoral punishment of the absenteeism rate of propor-
tional members of Parliament (B) – Second Republic
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Above-mean Below-mean Above-mean Below-mean
social capital social capital social capital social capital
Dependent variable: Reelected same district
Absenteeism rate 0.314*** 0.428*** 0.339 0.016
[0.102] [0.104] [0.361] [0.597]
Years of schooling 0.015** 0.018 0.237 0.249
[0.007] [0.015] [0.171] [0.268]
National politician 0.223*** -0.025 0.180 -0.109
[0.038] [0.067] [0.186] [0.273]
Government appointment 0.255*** -0.206 -0.050 -0.033
[0.077] [0.217] [0.200] [0.392]
Parliament appointment 0.033 0.000 -0.405* 0.583
[0.088] [0.062] [0.208] [0.434]
Local experience 0.038 0.015 0.000 -0.436
[0.055] [0.100] [0.000] [0.751]
Freshman -0.070 -0.067 -0.114 -0.293
[0.049] [0.058] [0.206] [0.400]
Majority coalition 0.066 0.133 0.107 0.419
[0.058] [0.133] [0.122] [0.279]
Preelection income 0.387** 0.169 -3.836 -8.194**
[0.157] [0.232] [2.418] [3.437]
Other control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province of election dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual ﬁxed eﬀects No No Yes Yes
Obs. 310 285 310 285
Wald test p-value 0.958 0.690
Notes. Probitestimationsin diﬀerentsubsamples(provinceswith social capitalabove/belowmean); socialcapitalis measured
as blood donation; marginal eﬀects reported. Members of Parliament elected in the proportional tier of the mixed-member
electoral system only. Dependent variable: dummy equal to one if the member of Parliament is reelected in the same
(majoritarian) district in the next term. Absenteeism rate is the percentage of votes missed without any legitimate reason
during the legislative term. Other control variables include: age, age squared, married, number of children, legislative term
dummies, job dummies, macro-region dummies (North-West, North-East, Center, South, Islands). Robust standard errors
clustered at the province of election level are in brackets. The Wald test evaluates whether the coeﬃcient of the absenteeism
rate is diﬀerent in the two subsamples (above/below mean). Signiﬁcance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5%
level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
44Table 14: Robustness check, alternative measures of social capital
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: The impact of social capital on misbehavior
Dependent variable: Dependent variable: Dependent variable:
RAP Serious RAP Absenteeism rate
Baseline eﬀect -0.045*** -0.012*** -0.064***
[0.005] [0.003] [0.020]
Eﬀect controlling -0.036*** -0.008** -0.060***
for newspapers [0.014] [0.004] [0.020]
Obs. 5,849 5,849 1,214
Panel B: Social capital and the electoral punishment of misbehavior
Dependent variable: Dependent variable: Dependent variable:
Log diﬀerence of votes Log diﬀerence of votes Reelected same district
Baseline eﬀect -0.019 -0.072** -0.181**
[0.016] [0.026] [0.080]
Eﬀect controlling -0.053** -0.141*** -0.315**
for newspapers [0.025] [0.040] [0.135]
Obs. 3,913 3,913 1,214
Notes. Social capital is measured as the principal component of: non-proﬁt organizations per capita in 2001 (source:
Istat); non-proﬁt employees per capita in 2001 (source: Istat); electoral participation in the 2000s (source: Cartocci 2007).
Column (1) refers to the First Republic and uses RAP as a measure of political misbehavior; column (2) refers to the First
Republic and uses serious RAP as a measure of political misbehavior; column (3) refers to the Second Republic and uses the
absenteeismrate as a measure of political misbehavior. RAP is equal to one if the politicianreceives a request for the removal
of parliamentary immunity because suspected of criminal wrongdoing. Serious RAP refers to a request for serious crimes
(see Appendix I). Absenteeism rate is the percentage of votes missed without any legitimate reason during the legislative
term. Panel A: marginal eﬀects of the social capital index in estimations with political misbehavior as dependent variable.
Columns (1) and (2): Probit estimations; column (3): OLS estimation. In addition to newspapers diﬀusion (second row
only), control variables include: age, age squared, married, number of children, legislative term dummies, job dummies,
macro-region dummies (North-West, North-East, Center, South, Islands). Robust standard errors clustered at the district
of election level are in brackets. Signiﬁcance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1%
level by ***. Panel B: coeﬃcients of the interaction term Social capital × political misbehavior in estimation with the log
diﬀerence of preference votes—columns (1) and (2)—or reelection in the same district—column (3)—as dependent variables.
In addition to the interaction between political misbehavior and newspapers diﬀusion (second row only), control variables
include: age, age squared, married, number of children, legislative term dummies, job dummies, macro-region dummies
(North-West, North-East, Center, South, Islands), and the interactions between political misbehavior and district-speciﬁc
income and education. Robust standard errors clustered at the province of election level are in brackets. Signiﬁcance at the
10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Notes. Electoral punishment is the district-speciﬁc eﬀect of re-
ceiving a RAP for serious crimes on the log diﬀerence of future
versus past votes. Social capital is measured as the number of
blood bags every 100 inhabitants. The district-speciﬁc character-
istics Zj include: income, education, and newspapers. The slope
coeﬃcient is equal to -0.073 (p-value: 0.000).
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Notes. Electoral punishment is the district-speciﬁc eﬀect of re-
ceiving a RAP for serious crimes on the log diﬀerence of future
versus past votes. Social capital is measured as the number of
blood bags every 100 inhabitants. The district-speciﬁc character-
istics Zj include: income, education, and newspapers. The slope
coeﬃcient is equal to -0.073 (p-value: 0.000).
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Notes. Electoral punishment is the province-speciﬁc eﬀect of the
absenteeism rate on reelection (majoritarian members of Parlia-
ment only). Social capital is measured as the number of blood
bags every 100 inhabitants. The district-speciﬁc characteristics
Zj include: income, education, and newspapers. The slope coeﬃ-
cient is equal to -0.169 (p-value: 0.000).
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Notes. Electoral punishment is the region-speciﬁc eﬀect of the ab-
senteeism rate on reelection (proportional members of Parliament
only). Social capital is measured as the number of blood bags
every 100 inhabitants. The district-speciﬁc characteristics Zj in-
clude: income, education, and newspapers. The slope coeﬃcient
is equal to -0.031 (p-value: 0.729).
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